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                      Artaud-Immunity:  Derrida and the Mômo !
                                 
More than the working through of a fascinated ambivalence, Derrida's returns to Artaud chronicle a 
sustained and determined campaign of immune defence. Yet what sets his  'little pieces on Artaud' 
apart from the dominant strategy of Artaud-immunisation inaugurated by the Correspondance avec 
Jacques Rivière (1924) is their refusal of the distinction between the 'clinical' and the  'critical'.  His 
essays of the 1960s 'La parole Soufflée' and 'The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of 
Representation' began the search for new ways to secure Artaud-immunity continued in forcener le 
subjectile (1986) and Artaud le Moma (2002).  He understood that Artaud not only evaded Rivière's 
defence of literature against his madness but also pre-empted all future attempts to mobilise the 
'clinical/critical' distinction against them.  This awareness gives Derrida's readings of his 'privileged 
enemy'  over their thirty years war (Derrida 2002, 19) a singular power and urgency among the 
philosophical readings of Artaud,  but one whose strategic compromises and evasions bore 
consequences that extended beyond the immediate aim of securing Artaud-immunity.    
!
For Derrida, Artaud posed the problem of how to read an oeuvre whose defences had been pre-
emptively disabled in an auto-immune reaction to anticipated rejection that seemed to verge on the 
suicidal.  His readings of Artaud's highly immunised texts and drawings were precursors of the 
formal inquiry into auto-immunity initiated in Faith and Knowledge (1998) and pursued up to 
Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (2005) and prepared for their understanding of auto-immunity as  
suicidal.   The limits of Derrida's understanding of auto-immunity are set by his Artaud-immunity 
that underestimated Artaud's counter-resistance as a chaotic Platonism in which the lowering of 
defences was anything but suicidal.  
!
                    Resistance and Counter-Resistance or the Return of the Celestial Poet 
!
Artaud's first steps towards immunising his work against clinical and critical resistance were taken 
in his correspondence with Jacques Rivière, an editor with La Nouvelle Revue Francaise. It was the 
publication of this epistolary testament to rejection that brought Artaud's work to the attention of a 
wider public including the adolescent Derrida.  The correspondence of poet and critic begins 
inauspiciously with a rejection letter dated May 1, 1923 in which Artaud learns that Rivière is 
regretfully  'unable to publish your poems in La Nouvelle Revue Francaise' (Artaud 1976, 31). The 
critic adds, though, that the unacceptable poems aroused his interest sufficiently to want to meet 
their author.  In the letter following this meeting dated June 5 1923, Artaud responds to Rivière's 
refusal to admit the poems into the realm of French literature as policed by the NRF by referring to 
the 'the acceptability of these poems' and the problem of their survival or 'literary existence' 
following rejection.  He immediately cites the 'horrible sickness of the mind' that afflicts his thought 
and expression, pre-empting Rivière's view that while his poems fail as literature they succeed as 
clinical symptoms.  In the face of such rejection – the resistance of a reasoned literature  to his mad 
poems - Artaud invokes another literature where 'the right to speak' is justified by suffering.  It is 
not that he wants his poems to be recognised as literature; he wants them to threaten the very 
institution of literature.  Artaud and Rivière commence a war of resistance and counter-resistance 
with each responding to the other with prudence and suspicion. Rivière replies on March 25th 1924, 
defending his rejection of the poems against the sufferer's claimed 'right to speak'  and deporting 
them to the clinic, converting their challenge to literature into symptoms of Artaud's 
psychopathology. 
!
  With this gesture Rivière opened a season of Artaud critique (or rather diagnosis) that has still to 
run its course, but whose success as an immune strategy was unwittingly compromised at ithe 
outset.  For Rivière felt impelled to publish the correspondence in place of the unpublishable 
poems.  For if literature cannot tolerate the poems, it can, perhaps must, display its successful 
immune defence as an exemplary neutralisation of a potential threat.  Artaud agrees to this 
proposition and the letters were published with, secreted in a postscript, one of the 'unpublishable' 
poems 'Cry' (Artaud 1976, 37-8). This poem became emblematic of Artaud's work, entering 
literature disguised as a clinical expression that in 8 stanzas and an envoi thematises immunity and 
the evasion of its defences.  It begins with the 'little celestial poet' opening 'the shutters of his heart' 
and letting the cosmic catastrophe flood in to undo his harmonies or 'symphony'.  Following this 
catastrophic infection the second stanza introduces the antagonist – the stableboy of the crazy house 
who remains unaware that the fury of the heavens has been unleashed on him.  The third stanza 
explains the stable-boy's task of guarding the house by silencing impurity, an open reference to the 
NRF's commitment to purity of expression evoked by Rivière in the correspondence.  Against this 
the poet poses the question:  if the world is full of impurity, what is left when it is 'muzzled' if not  
just silence and the night.  The stable boy's purity and perfection are words for death, themselves 
more mad than the celestial poet's opening his heart and lowering his defences against impurity and 
catastrophe.  
!
 The poem then introduces a cosmo-phagic star (ally of the celestial poet) that eats the heavens and 
then itself, leaving only night. But this is not the night of morbid purity since its darkness differs 
radically from that of the stableboy. The star consuming itself can be reborn, while in the silence 
and the night of the stableboy's confined perfection there remains only a slug – the institution of 
literature – whose transit, saluted by ten thousand white hands shuffling its pages, makes its way 
across an obliterated earth.  In the sixth stanza, the poem leaves the slug making its acclaimed trail 
across nothingness to return to the celestial poet.  The peaceful retreat of the angels from a vacated 
cosmos is interrupted by the call of the 'real voice of the Spirit' and thus – inverting the Gospel of 
John for here at the end is the word - everything begins again in a delirious repetition of creation 
that in the eighth stanza culminates in the underground sun vapourising the sea after which 'A dream 
strange but clear/was born on the earth gone mad'. (Artaud 1976, 37)  Apostle John's word made 
flesh that opened the history of spirit is rewritten as the eschatological word made vapour of an 
impossible re-creation. The eighth and final stanza of the poem's main sequence returns edgily to its 
catastrophic opening, except that now the 'celestial' has become the 'lost poet' or philosopher who 
leaves the heavens, perhaps for the mad earth, perhaps for nowhere, carrying 'an idea from beyond 
the earth' but with the shutters of his heart overgrown with luxuriant, protective hair...  In the envoi 
Artaud presents more formally the encounter of the poet and the guardian of literature, reflecting on 
what happened in the correspondence -  'two traditions met,/ but our padlocked thoughts did not 
have sufficient room' – but ending the poem with the optimistic instruction 'Experiment to be 
repeated' (Artaud 1976; 37-38). 
!
Beyond performing the failure of the correspondence, 'Cry' is remarkable for evading the defences 
of the stable-boy and entering literature encrypted as a symptom. 'Experiment to be repeated' 
indeed, and often, for even if the two padlocked thoughts – those of the mad poet and the vigilant 
stable-boy – did not have room to open to each other,  and even if this contraband poem was only 
allowed to exist under the mask of delirium, there nevertheless remained sufficient space to at least 
imagine a future for the experiment.  Artaud unpicked the critical padlock with this poem, and then 
infiltrated it into the stable of literature.  His subsequent works apply this lesson in evading immune 
defences by pre-empting the strictures of clinic and critique.  The critical and clinical strategy of 
containing the poems and so immunising literature from madness would prove a patent failure. 
Artaud's preferred strategy remained the one declared by the celestial poet, opening the shutters to 
madness. After all, it makes no sense to charge the man who steps before the public as the Mômo 
with being mad: claiming the right to speech in the name of madness pre-empts any appeal to 
clinical suppression. In the Correspondence avec Jacques Rivière Artaud claims both madness – 
disabling the defences of reason - and the right to speak; he cannot be silenced by the accusation of 
madness since he claims to speak in the name of its suffering. The resistance is countered in 
advance and the struggle for the word moved to a different level. 
!
                                        Defencelessness or to be done with naiveté          
!
 Derrida's first skirmish in his thirty years war with the celestial poet – 'La parole soufflée'  
published in Tel Quel in 1965 and then in Writing and Difference (1967) -  reviews Rivière's 
clinical/critical resistance to Artaud (re-mobilised in the early 1950s by Blanchot) and sets out in 
search of more subtle and effective Artaud-immunising strategies.  The opening sentence of 'La 
parole souflée' evokes 'naiveté' or defencelessness when attempting to speak to and of Artaud.  
Presciently Derrida suspects that 'it would take a long time' to diminish this defencelessness or to 
build up Artaud-immunity, but begins by reworking Blanchot, Foucault and Laplanche's fidelity to 
Rivière's strategy. His reworking does not repeat Rivière's defence of  'critical' by resort to 'clinical' 
discourse but sets both in a dialogue 'borne upon that which is beyond  their two trajectories, 
pointing toward the common elements of their origin and their horizon' (Derrida 1967, 212).   With 
Foucault's stricture at the end of The History of Madness firmly in mind, this strategy appeals to the 
enigmatic conjuncture of 'madness and the work'.  Literature cannot be defended by relegating 
Artaud's work to the realm of clinical symptom, but must rethink the conjunction of madness and 
work that it achieves.  Attentive to Artaud's call in the Correspondence avec Jacques Rivière that 
literature must change in order to receive his work, Derrida avoids speaking of a clinical and critical 
relation out of vigilance for the singular threat posed by the conjuncture of work and madness that 
is Artaud.  To describe this in terms of a modal relation reduces Artaud to an example of a larger 
operation – the history of literature expanding before the challenges to its limits - and mobilises a 
repertoire of strategic gestures no longer effective before the pre-immunised and thus singular threat 
of the Mômo. 
!
Blanchot, Laplanche and Foucault's subtle adjustments to the critical/clinical strategy met a 
difficulty Derrida recognised as common to all pharmacological resistances; they expose through 
their very effort to protect: 'At the moment when criticism  (be it aesthetic, literary, philosophical, 
etc.) allegedly protects the meaning of a thought or the value of a work against psycho-medical 
reductions, it comes to the same result through the opposite path: it creates an example.That is to 
say, a case.' (Derrida 1967, 214)  Blanchot's reading of Artaud in The Book to Come is reproached 
for effecting this reduction; it immunises the work from the madness of Artaud by making his 'entire 
adventure' 'only the index of a transcendental structure' (Derrida 1967, 213), albeit a mad one.  
Derrida recognises this as a replay of Rivière's strategy, sugared with negative-dialectical 
ornamentation but fundamentally vulnerable to Artaud pre-emptive strategy.  The same holds for 
Laplanche who, while critical of Blanchot, ends by regarding the work (of Hölderlin) as a 
privileged example of madness that offers symptomatic access to the experience and understanding 
of schizophrenia.  Derrida is wary of protecting this exemplary madness, even more of defending a 
violated singularity from critical violence: 'it is not because we think, and this credit will have to be 
granted us, that subjective existence, the originality of the work or the singularity of the beautiful, 
must be protected against the violence of the concept by means of moral and aesthetic 
precautions.' (Derrida 1967, 218)  He is careful not to invest in the sentimental scenario of 
immunising a victim against the violence of the critical or clinical concept about to be applied to 
them, since this fatally underestimates the threat posed by Artaud.  Artaud showed himself tactically 
aware in the Correspondence avec Jacques Rivière of how to disarm by exploiting the 'moral and 
aesthetic' scruples of the 'stableboy' before the mad poet.   Derrida at this point attempts to invent a 
new strategic portfolio tailored to the singular 'encounter' in  his 'war' – with Artaud.  He  reasons 
the need to intensify this violence, to respect his enemy and to learn from the 'defeats' of his 
sentimental predecessors whose appeal to critical and clinical authority disabled their defences and 
prevented them from building up sufficient Artaud-immunity. 
!
 And so the essay begins again, returning to naiveté which, in case we had not realised it, 'was not a 
stipulation of style' (Derrida 1967, 219) but always that defensive strategy of the calculated 
lowering of defences.  Throwing away the defence doctrine of Rivière and the Neo-Rivièrians 
provoked one of the first intense bursts of strategic reflection to emerge from Derrida's Artaud wars. 
It is vital never to underestimate the Mômo, for he is engaged in a war of absolute resistance: 'If 
Artaud absolutely resists – and, we believe, as was never done before – clinical or critical exegeses, 
he does so by virtue of that part of his adventure  (and with this word we are designating a totality 
anterior to the separation of the life and the work) which is the very protest itself against 
exemplification itself. The critic and doctor are without resource when confronted by an existence 
that refuses to signify, or by an art without works, a language without a trace.' (Derrida 1967, 219)  
This is a war of resistance that pre-emptively addressed 'the history of dualist metaphysics which 
more or less subterraneously inspired the essays invoked above [by Blanchot, Foucault and 
Laplanche]' (Derrida 1967, 219) as well as the structure of theft by an invisible souffleur or 
prompter in the theatre who ensures the actor's fidelity to the text being played.    
!
Derrida describes the function of the invisible  prompter with a signature neologism: 'it ensures the 
indispensable différance and intermittence between a text already written by another hand and an 
interpreter already dispossessed of that which he receives.' (Derrida 1967, 221) Ensuring the respect 
of différance is the strategy pursued by Artaud's enemy; but had not Artaud already pre-empted the 
protection offered by différance  and the souffleur by implicating them in the metaphysical scene? 
In defending différance against Artaud, the souffleur cannot simply repeat the metaphysical text 
since this is already compromised, but if he does not, then he is no longer a souffleur no longer an 
invisible guardian of the text but a conscript for the theatre of cruelty. How then can the souffleur 
ensure respect of différance without cruelty?  He must begin by recognising the level of threat 
posed by his adversary:  'Artaud desired the conflagration of the stage upon which the prompter 
[souffleur] was possible and where the body was under the rule of a foreign text. Artaud wanted the 
machinery of the prompter [souffleur] spirited away [soufflé], wanted to plunder the structure of 
theft. To do so, he had to destroy, with one and the same blow, both poetic inspiration and the 
economy of classical art, singularly the economy of the theatre. And through the same blow he had 
to destroy the metaphysics, religion, aesthetics etc., that supported them.'(Derrida 1967, 221) 
Derrida will return Artaud's blows thirty years later, when he will be just as clear that these blows 
were directed at him and that he always knew how to parry them.   
!
What does Artaud put in the place of the security and protection offered by the souffleur – the 
invisible guarantor of the text and protector of the actor against the lapse of memory?  Derrida, 
looking out from the little booth at the front of the classical stage of metaphysics, appreciates the 
gravity of the threat: 'He would thus open up to Danger a world no longer sheltered by the structure 
of theft. To restore Danger by reawakening the stage of cruelty – this was Antonin Artaud's stated 
intention at the very least.' (Derrida 1967, 221)  And it is here that Derrida perceives a weak point in 
Artaud's metaphysical immunity; a self-disabling of his own lines of defence in the name of 
exposure to Danger.  Derrida detects a 'calculated slip' in this opening to Danger, but is sure enough 
of his enemy to be unsure whether the 'flaw' is not a trap. Artaud evades the fixed defences of 
metaphysics manned by  Rivière and his proteges by lowering his defences and abandoning the 
protection they seem to offer. The calculated lowering of the defences of reason permits Derrida to 
prompt  Artaud: 'Loss, precisely, is the metaphysical determination into which I will have to slip my 
works if they are to be understood within a world and a literature unwittingly governed by the 
metaphysics for which Jacques Rivière served as a delegate' (Derrida 1967, 222)  Having to lower 
defences, to claim silence and irresponsibility prior to affirming Danger seems to open a chink for 
souffleur to enter and steal Artaud's words. And Derrida does so – for who else is the 'I' slipped into 
this passage  ('I will have to slip...') who would evade the metaphysics of Rivière than the souffleur 
speaking for Artaud, prompting Artaud.   The lowering of defences (auto-immune cruelty) and the 
opening to Danger permits the return of  the prompter, who ensures that Artaud properly performs 
Artaud, that is to say, cruelly betrays himself. 
!
Derrida's is not a critical or clinical assessment of Artaud, but an infiltration, a viral overriding of 
Artaud-immunity that protects it while prompting its exposure to danger.  Artaud's cruelty is 
faithfully performed on the proscenium stage of metaphysics guarded over by the invisible 
souffleur. But perhaps Artaud's vulnerability at the moment of lowering defences is feigned, a decoy 
in the spirit of Sun Tzu that makes a noise in the east before attacking from the west?  Derrida gives 
the possibility a full airing but only to expose the strategic weaknesses of the souffleur.  Speaking as 
ever for Artaud, prompting him here in the name of his true desire, Derrida mimes his opposition to 
the scenario of loss imposed by having to disable his metaphysical defences. He (the souffleur is 
giving him the words) he 'wants to explode it. He opposes to this inspiration of loss and 
dispossession a good inspiration, the very inspiration that is missing from inspiration as 
loss' (Derrida 1967, 224-5) And yet 'he' by saying so, is recaptured by the metaphysical opposition 
between good and bad inspiration.  Making Artaud speak in this way underestimates the poet's 
capacity to resist, his own Artaud-immunity.  For Derrida can only imagine such self-disabling of 
defences as suicide followed by rebirth: 'This is why – such is the concept of true suicide according 
to Artaud – I must die away from my death in order to be reborn “immortal” at the eve of my 
birth' (Derrida 1967, 228).  Yet, ever the souffleur,  the prompts by which Derrida leads Artaud to 
this onto-theological terminus are not entirely apt, and forget Artaud's direct and sustained attacks 
on the gesture of suicide: the celestial poet was not suicided by the cosmos. His objections – to take 
his voice against Derrida's taking his voice – maintain that embracing danger by suspending 
defences only appears suicidal from the secured standpoint of metaphysics.  Indeed, Derrida's 
consistent alignment of auto-immunity with suicide – the self robbing itself of its own life - 
originates in this moment of translating Artaud-immunity into the Latin sui-cide.    
!
Derrida ends by revealing his strategy and the line of fortification he has erected against Artaud.  It 
comprises a cruel manoeuvre in which the erstwhile prompter metamorphoses into a choreographer,  
producing the spectacle of Artaud walking the line between murder and resurrection:  'One entire 
side of his discourse destroys a tradition which lives within difference, alienation, and negativity 
without seeing their origin and necessity. To reawaken this tradition, Artaud in sum, recalls it to its 
own motifs: self-presence, unity, self-identity, the proper etc. '(Derrida 1967, 244) .  After de/
prescribing these actions Derrida lends them metaphysical character:  'Artaud's “metaphysics,” at its 
most critical moments, fulfils the most profound and permanent ambition of Western 
metaphysics.' (Derrida 1967, 244) But in a final twist, Derrida detects in this a cruel 'law of 
difference' a fixed line of defence where Artaud abandons 'metaphysical naiveté'.  The restoration of 
defences, the abandoning of the defenceless posture that Derrida feigned at the outset of his essay, 
thus renders Artaud's defensive and offensive strategy transparent to his enemies.  
!
Derrida explicitly identifies these movements as part of a devastating stratagem on Artaud's part, all 
the deadlier for never being explicitly disclosed: 'The duplicity of Artaud's text, simultaneously 
more and less than a stratagem' (Derrida 1967, 244) has 'unceasingly obliged us to pass over to the 
other side of the limit' (Derrida 1967, 244).  Yet this disarming avowal is not all it would seem, 
since Derrida is not just maintaing a bi-polar offensive posture with respect to Artaud as 
recommended by the Maoist doctrine close to the editors and readers of Tel Quel – when Artaud 
destroys Derrida preserves, when Artaud preserves, Derrida destroys – but is setting himself to 
reveal naiveté as a tactic.  By exposing Artaud's denunciation of the 'naïve implications of 
difference' from a position that feigns 'the closure of presence' he will claim that this exposure 
compromises Artaud's immune strategy.  So while admitting that he might seem to be 'criticising 
Artaud's metaphysics from the standpoint of metaphysics itself,' this is but a feint since his real 
strategy consists in 'delineating a fatal complicity' in Artaud. The complicity is 'fatal' for prompting 
a hiatus between lowering defences and affirming danger that is the vulnerable point of Artaud-
immunity, namely that 'necessary dependency of all destructive discourses: they must inhabit the 
structures they demolish, and within them they must shelter an indestructible desire for full 
presence, for nondifference: simultaneously life and death'.(Derrida 1967, 244-5)  But we already 
saw that understanding this life/death as a suicidal gesture underestimated Artaud's defences, since 
for him immunity is not suicidal but, we shall see, chaotic. The essay ends with  a tactical retreat as 
Derrida appreciates that his strategy of revealing the tactical deployment of complicity while much 
more supple and apparently effective than the clinical/critical distinction of Rivière et.al., had 
already been anticipated by Artaud.  The souffleur does not really believe that performance of 
Artaud just concluded ends in the life that chooses death or suicide.   
!
                                  Avoiding Chaos or the Perversion of Metaphysics 
!
 Derrida was aware that Artaud's madness was part of his studied, even scholastic perversion of 
Platonism.  His suspicion that Artaud's 'metaphysical rage for re-appropriation' (Derrida 2002, 20) 
was complicit with metaphysics and available for deconstruction was persistent and well-founded.  
Yet he also knew that his prompt of Artaud's suicidal demolition of metaphysics barely 
approximated the precision and power of Artaud's anti-metaphysical rage and its proximity to the 
theatre of cruelty.  This is clear from Artaud's remarkable 'Mis-en-scène and Metaphysics' –  a key 
essay in the collection The Theatre and its Double published by Gallimard on the eve of Artaud's 
incarceration in 1938.  This essay shows an Artaud not so much complicit with Platonism than 
actively and cruelly perverting it.  From the initial step of replacing the idea of reason or nous with 
madness in the response to Rivière, Artaud moves in this essay towards an internally articulated, 
chaotic platonism.  
!
Artaud sees Lucas van den Leyden's Lot and his Daughters in the Louvre as an scene from the end 
of the world choreographed as a procession of perverted Platonic ideas.  The procession first 
appears as a detail in the painting – a 'bridge, high as an eight story house, rising over the sea, and 
across which figures are parading single file like the ideas in Plato's cave' (Artaud 1938, 230; 522) – 
and then extends across the entire painting. But these are not the canonical ideas of Being, the One, 
the Good, the True and the Beautiful that populate the Platonic and neo-Platonic firmament but their  
cruel perversions. Projected on the walls of Artaud's cave are the shadows of the ideas of sexuality 
and reproduction, 'with Lot seemingly placed there to live off his daughters like a pimp' (Artaud 
1938, 230; 524) that undo the Platonic family romance that would so fascinate Derrida in 'Plato's 
Pharmacy,' followed by a procession of perverted substitutes.  In Artaud's procession the idea of 
Becoming takes the place of Being, followed by the idea of fatality that brings both organisation 
and disorganisation to the subordinate ideas that succeed it. The place of the One is assumed by the 
idea of Chaos followed by the ideas of the miraculous, of equilibrium and finally the idea of aphasia 
or 'impotences of speech'  that replaces the logos of truth.  In this procession the cardinal ideas of  
Being, the One, and the Logos are twisted into Becoming, Chaos, and Aphasia. The world is still 
governed by a procession of ideas – is still metaphysical – but the ideas themselves have undergone 
a cruel sea-change in Artaud's hands . 
!
Artaud strategically affirms the ideas and his concession that he is 'reluctant to use that word' 
metaphysics (Artaud 1976, 230) is a disarming diversion. His Platonic mis-en-scene has already 
second-guessed the deconstructive gesture to come, and moreover flaunts its immunity by 
describing that mis-en-scene as the theatre of cruelty.  For after deciphering the procession of 
perverted ideas in Lot and his Daughters Artaud moves immediately to his attack on Western 
Theatre. In the foreground is the Platonic cave and its status as the mis-en-scene of both tragedy and 
its philosophical critique.   The perverted Platonism evoked by Artaud requires not only a new cave  
but also the rejection of the inaugural Greek liaison between philosophy and tragic drama located in 
the Platonic dialogue.  As Nietzsche showed in the Birth of Tragedy, Euripidean theatre's 
commitment to dialogue was part of its debt to philosophy, a debt renounced in Artaud's theatre of 
cruelty. Not only theatre, but philosophy must be freed from its confinement to dialogue and the 
logos. The new mis-en-scene will not be the mural screen of Plato's cave but ' a physical and 
concrete place'  where a 'concrete' aphasic language 'independent of speech'  is uttered in a way that 
addresses all the senses.  The poetry of language – bound up in the relation of the Logos of Truth 
with the ideas of Reason,  Being, the One the Good and the True - recedes before the 'poetry of 
space' made up of 'physical images' governed by the idea of chaos.  These images inhabit a Platonic 
mis-en-scene: Becoming, Madness and Chaos are not expressed through the logos, but through the 
governing idea of aphasia. 
!
The theatre of cruelty that renounces Western and Latin theatre of written text, language and 
dialogue seems to pose a difficult case for deconstruction. It has pre-emptively declared itself 
metaphysical while remaining inimical to the Latin investment in the idea as written text and to 
speech and the logos.  Artaud discards the Latin/Western strategy of securing the audience's 
conviction through reasoned, dramatic, dialogical speech in the philosophical drama; his audience  
is exposed less to conviction than to contagion. The first essay of The Theatre and its Double 
equates the theatre with plague, an equation described in terms of the darkening of Platonic eros by 
the Latin/Western libido that for Artaud sickened life.  He dreamt of supplanting the theatre of 
speech, dialogue and light  with another, openly cruel and professedly epidemic, which 'Invites 
spirit to a delirium that enhances its energies.' (Artaud 2004,  520)  While there can be no return to 
Platonic eros as the liaison between the world and ideas, Artaud sees in the madness and enhanced 
energy of the theatre of cruelty an antidote to the poisons of reason and libido. 
!
The theatre of cruelty is professedly anarchic, but anarchic by Platonic principle; it is an anarchy 
governed, paradoxically, by the energetic law that participates the ideas of Chaos, Becoming and 
Speechlessness - 'crowned anarchy' in the formula of Artaud's manifesto for a perverted Platonism 
Héliogabale ou l'anarchiste couronné  (1934).   This might appear as much a cruel and prescient 
undoing of logocentrism as an unrepentant metaphysical affirmation of presence; but it is neither, or 
rather it is the strategic perversion of both.  Artaud's writings are in both cases immunised against 
any hasty critique or deconstruction;  hence the extreme care with which Derrida handles them, 
deploying a level of precaution against contagion unique to his work.  For Artaud is a singular 
enemy whose power of contagious madness has to be approached with care.  Derrida's war consists 
in resisting contagion from a highly immunised pathogen that presents itself as totally exposed.  The 
philosopher must enter the cave prepared,  but in the case of the theatre of cruelty they must be 
immunised against the contagion of the ideas of chaos, becoming and a language that is not logos 
but  'anarchic insofar as its appearance is the consequence of a disorder that brings us closer to 
chaos' (Artaud 1976, 236).    
!
Derrida's second confrontation with Artaud in Writing and Difference – 'The Theatre of Cruelty and 
the Closure of Representation' 'delivered at the Artaud colloquium' in April 1966 and published in 
Bataille's Critique in the same year  - professes to engage directly with 'all the texts' of  The Theatre 
and its Double, regarding them as 'more solicitations  than a sum of precepts, more a system of 
critiques shaking the entirety of Occidental history than a treatise on theatrical practice.' (Derrida 
1967, 296).  And yet it remains reticent about the strategic perversion of Platonism Artaud ventured 
in Mis-en-scène and Metaphysics' and limits itself to addressing only one aspect of it.  Artaud's 
perversion of Platonism's cardinal ideas follow each other in a choreographed procession but 
Derrida approaches them selectively:  he focuses on Logos, and to a lesser extent Being but does 
not engage chaos.  The selective reception of Artaud's perversely systematic procession is essential 
to Derrida's 'complicity with metaphysics' deconstructive strategy, but operates on too narrow a 
front to provide effective protection.  Leaving unanalysed the idea of chaos articulated in 'Mis en 
scène and Metaphysics' and largely shunning this essay – Artaud's most extended and considered 
reckoning with metaphysics – allows this idea to wreak its effects on Derrida's exposed and 
vulnerable texts.   
!
Derrida dissembles a distance from the 'complicity with metaphysics' strategy pursued in the parole 
soufflée by emphasising the affirmative character of the theatre of cruelty: 'It affirms, it produces 
affirmation itself in its full and necessary rigour' (Derrida 1967, 293).  Here Derrida uncouples 
affirmation and negation, abandoning the defensive posture of the previous essay that required their 
complicity.  The affirmation of the theatre of cruelty does not require any dialectical negation of 
past theatres but opens of its own necessity. The void it would fill has not been hollowed out within 
conventional theatre, but is affirmed as 'the space of this unique opening of this distance' (Derrida 
1967, 294).   Yet the character and extent of this affirmative opening is very quickly limited, first by 
regarding this affirmation - 'the theatrical practice of cruelty' - as the expulsion of God from the 
stage, which is to say, in spite of all the earlier precautions, an act still scarred by dialectical 
negation.  And after demolishing the stage of onto-theology all that is left for this affirmation to do, 
for Derrida, is live with the legacy of its negation:  'The theatrical practice of cruelty, in its action 
and structure, inhabits or rather produces a nontheological space.' (Derrida 1967, 296).  The 
affirmation can only only open a space defined negatively as not-theological rather than 
affirmatively expressing its own necessity.  Derrida is unobtrusively remobilising the complicity 
strategy, making Artaud's affirmation hostage first to the negation of God and then to the 
representative logos of metaphysics and the western stage. 
!
Derrida consolidates his position by aligning the theological stage with representative logos: 'The 
stage is theological for as long as it is dominated by speech, by a will to speech, by the layout of a 
primary logos which does not belong to the theatrical site and governs it from a distance. The stage 
is theological for as long as its structure, following the entirety of tradition, comports the following 
elements: an author-creator who, absent and from afar, is armed with a text and keeps watch over, 
assembles, regulates the time or the meaning of representation, letting this latter     
represent him as concerns what is called the content of his thoughts, his intention, his 
ideas.' (Derrida 1967, 296)  The new logos of mis en scène has implications for the pairing of 
representation and presence:  'The stage will no longer operate as the repetition of a present, will no 
longer represent a present that would exist elsewhere and prior to it, a present whose plentitude 
would be older than it, absent from it, and rightfully capable of doing without it: the being present 
to itself of the absolute Logos, the living present of God.' (Derrida 1967, 299)  Derrida seems to 
grant the purity of Artaud's affirmation by describing the theatre of cruelty as 'a space produced 
from within itself and no longer organised from the vantage of an other absent site, an illocality, an 
alibi or invisible utopia.' (Derrida 1967, 300) Yet while freeing the stage from the divine logos, 
Derrida leaves it bound to the ruins of the old stage that it must continue to inhabit or haunt.  
!
By approaching the theatre of cruelty via the logos and remaining silent about chaos, Derrida 
surgically removes from Artaud's thought the cardinal, energetic idea of chaos, the affirmative 
power that opens new spaces without implicating them in negation. In 'Mis en scène and 
Metaphysics' chaos takes the place of the One in energising the procession of the other ideas. By 
restricting Artaud's perverted Platonism to the ideas of the logos and being, Derrida deprives it of 
the energy necessary to sustain its affirmation and forces it to fall back on the energy released by 
negation. By maintaining the unobtrusive sovereignty of the One, Derrida's reading of Artaud keeps 
it within the law of representation, even when it most violently seems to step out of it.  The anarchic 
energy of chaos that drives affirmation without reference to law or transgression – one that Derrida 
clearly understands as Artaud's objective for the theatre of cruelty - is literally disempowered by the 
suppression of the idea of chaos.  The implications of this suppression reverberate throughout the 
essay, in the fear of the 'anarchy' of improvisation or the irony concerning the 'happenings' (a 
movement in American art that stands in direct lineage to the reading and translation of Artaud in 
Black Mountain College during the early 1950s).  Thus the gestures of the second part of the essay 
that distance Artaud from representation and repetition are literally gestures, for a reading that 
excludes the cardinal idea of chaos disempowers Artaud and lends a histrionic air to his signals 
from the pyre. 
!
The end of Derrida's essay is nevertheless drawn back to the idea of chaos so carefully evaded 
throughout.  It cites and interprets Artaud's 'organised anarchy' out of which theatre is born as an 
impossible attempt to achieve a 'theatre without representation'. Yet the chaos Artaud saw in 
'organised anarchy' is again interpreted as a suicidal energy that includes death as one of its 
possibilities: 'The energy of Western theatre thus lets itself be encompassed within its own 
possibility, which is not accidental and serves as a constitutive centre and structuring locus for the 
entire history of the West.' (314)  The corollaries of this confinement to possibility or what Artaud 
called the reign of  'simplicity and order' include the penetration of presence by representation, of 
affirmation by repetition and the act of erasure 'that confirms the transgressed law' (Derrida 1967, 
314-15)  Anarchy is called to its organisational limit, and theatre to the 'space of tragedy,' yet there 
is also an energy working at this limit between possibility and impossibility which points to the 
working and underworking of chaos.   
!
The word with which Derrida is forced to conclude his essay is 'fatal,'  a term he has prepared 
carefully in distancing of himself from Artaud.  Derrida's fatality undoes all Artaud's intentions, it is 
'the fatal limit of  cruelty which begins with its own representation' (Derrida 1967, 316) a 'circular 
limit' or 'cruelty as the unity of necessity and chance' (Derrida 1967, 316) or 'the cruel powers of 
death and play which permit presence to be born to itself, and pleasurably to consume itself through 
the representation in which it eludes itself in its deferral' (Derrida 1967, 316).  And if not dialectical, 
this movement is nevertheless chiasmic – it is the tragic, the closure of representation 'not as the 
representation of fate, but as the fate of representation'(Derridea 1967, 316).  Derrida leaves us with 
the task of thinking this fatal chiasmus:  'And it is to think why it is fatal that, in its closure, 
representation continues.'(Derrida 1967, 316). But to end thus, with fatality, is to repeat the gesture 
of containing Artaud's chaotic Platonism that is constitutive of this essay.  For in his perverted neo-
platonic hierarchy presented in 'The Mis-en-scene and Metaphysics' Artaud places the idea of 
fatality in a pivotal place between the ideas of becoming (perverted 'being') and chaos (the perverted 
'One').   
!
In his reading of 'Lot and his Daughters' Artaud locates fatality in what The Theatre and its Double 
will call 'organised anarchy'.  Strictly Platonic, the idea of fatality is participated through 'the 
solemn way in which all forms are organised or disorganised beneath it'  some 'bending between an 
irresistible wind of panic' others 'motionless and almost ironic' (Artaud 1976,  230).  Fatality is the 
idea of possibility and impossibility identified by Derrida as 'tragic' or the closure of representation 
prior to the world governed by the idea of becoming.  But while Derrida ends here, for Artaud 
fatality is a mid-point in his chaotic hierarchy. Fatality participates chaos and is cited by Artaud 
alongside the ideas of the  'miraculous,'  and 'equilibrium'.  And just as negative theology departed 
from the premise of the impossibility of henology, all logical discourses of 'the One' so too Artaud's 
idea of Chaos cannot  be expressed by the logos, the 'impotences'  and 'uselessness' of speech shown 
in 'this supremely physical and anarchic painting' (Artaud,  230).  Derrida, that is to say, tarries in 
the dialectical oppositions of the realm of the idea of fatality, confining Artaud there without 
acknowledging the full force of his chaotic metaphysics nor the insane majesty of his perverted 
Platonism. 
!
                                                Drawing, or the Scene of the  Word 
!
 Artaud's almost programmatic statement that the mis-en-scene of a chaotic metaphysics can 
discerned better in painting than in speech corresponds to a shift from theatre towards drawing and 
painting.  But his practice is firmly situated with respect to the idea of chaos. Derrida too must 
move his front and forsake Artaud's theatre for his drawings and painting. The task of neutralising 
Artaud's chaotic mis-en-scene is engaged at the very outset of his 1986 'Forcener le subjectile'  
published alongside Paula Thévenin's essay 'La recherche d'un monde perdu' in Artaud Dessins et 
portraits.  The first sentence announces a return to the problem of the mis-en-scene, but rephrasing 
it in terms of force and the subjectile: 'I would call this a scene, the scene of the subjectile, if there 
was not already a force at work there to spirit away what always sets up the scene: the visibility, the 
element of representation, the presence of a subject, even an object.' (Derrida 1986, 55).  Orienting 
Artaud's mis-en-scene according the scene of the subjectile and the light-fingered force that already 
thieves or 'spirits away' (subtiliser) what sets the scene, Derrida not only returns us to the thieving 
souffleur but once again diverts our attention away from the chaotic Platonism that energised 
Artaud's mis-en-scene of metaphysics.  Derrida foregrounds the subjectile, opening an extended 
reflection on what is neither subject not object, but rather the throw, or the 'force before form'.  Yet 
viewed against the backdrop of Artaud's procession of ideas, this throw is but the vehicle of 
participation – methexis – 'The subjectile: itself between two places. It has two situations for itself. 
As the support of a representation, it's the subject which has become a gisant, spread out, stretched 
out, inert, neutral...It is then treated otherwise: as that which participates in the forceful throwing or 
casting, but also, and for just that, as what has to be traversed, pierced, penetrated in order to have 
done with the screen, that is, the inert support of representation' (Derrida 1986, 63).    
!
Derrida situates Artaud's pictograms according to the 'rhythmical projection and the inscription of a 
projectile' (Derrida 1986, 65) thus holding them within the sphere of participation – radicalizing 
methexis by making it an ungovernable throw rather than a transparent medium.  Artaud is conceded 
his step beyond the Latinity against which he raged and the moribund 'clear ideas' expressed in the 
Western theatre and its metaphysical analogues that he despised, but only as a force for 
destabilisation.  Derrida's pictograms and their subjectiles 'destabilise the proposition, that is to say 
a certain historical relation between the subject, the object and the subjectile.'(Derrida 1986, 66)  
Unfortunately such destabilisation of methexis, such burning of holes in participation,  fails to 
immunise against disturbance at more fundamental levels. For Artaud's perverse Platonism locates 
disturbance not only in participation but more disturbingly at the level of the cardinal ideas – 
replacing the One with Chaos and letting the substitution wreak its due consequences on any 
attempt to participate either it or the procession of ideas whose course it perverted. Derrida, 
however, restricts disturbance to the realm of participation, opening himself to the suspicion that he 
has left intact the eidetic structure that Artaud deranged. The corollary of this restriction is that 
despite appearances, 'Artaud' has a rational kernel, an intact structure disrupted only in its 
expression.  The pictogram is held within the limits of participation (understood since Descartes in 
terms of 'representation'): 'Pictogram will designate from now on this destabilisation become 
work' (Derrida 1986, 66) That is to say, Artaud's ambition completely to derange not only the 
communication but the essential structure of the ideas is restrained within the limits of a permitted 
destabilising of the participation of an intact or immunised structure.  In Artaud's terms, Derrida has 
mistaken him for Lewis Carroll.    
!
After preparing this defence in 'Forcener le Subjectile', Derrida is forced finally to confront the 
'exemplary'  1931 lecture 'La Mise en scène et la métaphysique' in order to quiet the memories of 
Artaud's chaotic Platonism.  His reading scrupulously avoids Artaud's perversion of the procession 
of ideas, tirelessly translating this derangement into a disturbance of participation.  He begins by 
citing a passage from Artaud's essay that occurs after the introduction of the perverse ideas, a 
citation that he truncates and severs from its place within a parenthesis.  In the essay Artaud has 
arrived at the point of reflecting on the methexis appropriate to his perverted, chaotic Platonism.  It 
will no longer have to do with the logos or with language but 'consists of everything that occupies 
the stage, everything that can be manifested and expressed physically on a stage and that addresses 
itself first to the senses instead of addressing itself to the mind, like the language of speech.' (Artaud 
1976, 231) He follows this with a parenthesis in which he admits that 'I am quite aware...'  
conceding that in some circumstances words have their place in this physical manifestation.  
Derrida however suppresses the context, erases the parenthesis and deletes the formula Artaud uses 
when rebutting obvious and perverse misunderstandings of what he is saying 'Je sais bien...”  By 
editing Artaud in this way,  Derrida transforms his rebuttal into a statement of principle, linking his 
comments on intonation with the problematic of language as subjectile. Yet he deletes – for obvious 
reasons - the later part of the parenthesis where Artaud dismisses precisely this view of language as 
a 'subordinate aspect of language for the playwright' with the formula 'So I shall not consider 
it'  (Artaud 1976, 232).  The discussion that for Artaud barely merited a parenthesis returns in 
'Forcener le subjectile' as the point of departure for Derrida's reading,  one perversely legitimated by 
citing Gide (!) and converting Artaud's mis-en-scene governed by the idea of chaos into the 'drama 
of the subjectile'.  His subsequent citations from the essay –  described as 'exemplary' with respect 
to the drama of the subjectile - focus on the Lucas van den Leyden painting, but with no reference 
to the perversion of Platonism that organises Artaud's reading of it.    
!
In approaching the painting Derrida cites a paragraph where Artaud draws an analogy between 
watching a firework display and the effects of the sound and lights on perception.  He fails to 
stipulate that this section of the essay moves from methexis as fire towards the ideas of chaos that it 
participates.  Artaud seems to describe the subjectile as 'an element that is still active and mobile in 
an immobilised form' (Artaud 1976, 229), one that serves  'by its very violence, to counterbalance in 
the mind the physical solidity and weight of the rest' (Artaud 1976, 229) but as an explicit 
propadeutic for the contemplation of perverted ideas.  For Derrida it serves as a cue to jump to the 
end of the essay and Artaud's reflections on metaphysics, speech and incantation contrasted with the 
sensuous mis-en-scene of the oriental theatre that 'has retained intact the secrets of using gestures, 
intonations and harmony in relation to the senses and on all possible levels.' (Artaud 1976, 239) 
Artaud's essay ends with this affirmative gesture towards a inflammatory participation of the 
chaotic ideas through the senses and not the logos. Derrida however chooses to read this affirmation 
as pure destruction, overlooking that Artaud's last words involve the specific destruction of 
hindrances to the free exercise of thought. And this is best described in Artaud's earlier description 
of the Balinese performers as 'these metaphysicians of natural disorder' whose thinking dance is  'a 
metaphysical struggle, [in which] the rigidity of the body in trance, stiffened by the surge of the 
cosmic forces invading it, is admirably expressed in this dance, both frenzied and full of rigidity and 
angles, in which one suddenly senses the beginning of the headlong fall of the mind.' (Artaud 1976, 
225) The invasive cosmic forces issue from the idea of chaos, 'like waves of matter breaking one on 
top of the other, and rushing from all sides of the horizon to enter into an infinitesimal space of 
trembling, of trance – and to cover over the void with fear.' (Artaud 1976, 224).  The participation 
of chaos, understood as fire and the senses is here mis-en-scene in terms of waves of matter 
approaching from 'all sides' of a horizon and focusing on a fulcrum of instability unavailable to 
consciousness and productive of insecurity. 
!
                                                     Mômo or Moma      
!
The dancer in a frenzied trance, possessed by the idea of chaos, dances through the The Theatre and 
its Double; but their affirmation of chaos at the end of 'Mise en scène and Metaphysics' is 
misunderstood by Derrida as destructive violence.  The frenzied trance of the Balinese dancer 
anticipated in the lost, celestial poet introduced into the Correspondance avec Jacques Rivière will 
return as the Mômo in 1947.  The word of spirit that in the poem 'Cry' drove creation into reverse 
and became the governing idea of chaos re-emerges in Artaud the Mômo as 'the anchored spirit/ 
screwed into me/ by the psycho-lubricious/ thrust, of the sky' (Artaud 1976, 523).  Celestially 
impaled, freed but also bound in a rigid, frenzied trance,  the Mômo can move through every 
temptation, desire but also every inhibition.   He has his own language like that of the voice which 
called earlier to the angels - o dedi/a dada orzoura/o dou zoura/a dada skizi – but while impaled 
by the 'idea from beyond the earth' he is also beyond the membrane of the celestial vault, beyond 
but in a sense also between, forming the very membrane itself.  Impalement is the perverse methexis 
or the participation of the deranged ideas, but now,  once the Mômo has been un-padlocked and  has 
left the space of the asylum he need not repeat the experiment since he has become literature.  But 
what of the danger of repeating the correspondence with Rivière, of being displayed as the 
successfully vanquished limit of a negated institution? What of the danger of repeating this 
enclosure, not as a poet but a visual artist, displayed as the successfully immunised threat to the 
museum?  
!
What does it mean when, almost fifty years later, Mômo becomes Moma?  
!
 Derrida's caution in Artaud le Moma is evident in both the detournement of Artaud's 1947 title 
Artaud le Mômo and in his Avertissement.  Citing Artaud's immunitory gesture against institutional 
refusal – you have to accept me as the Mômo – Derrida is wary of any complicity with the 
institutional Artaud-immunity that he had consistently resisted.  And so he begins by carefully 
delimiting the date of the talk – 16 October 1996 – and its occasion, the exhibition of Artaud's 
drawings and paintings at the New York Museum of Modern Art (MOMA).   Signing his text six 
years later in 2002, he describes the talk as an 'attempt to approach' that is to say a precautious 
approach to the one who called himself  'Artaud the Mômo'.  But it is a double precaution, against 
Artaud but also protecting him from the immunising gesture of exhibiting his work in the museum. 
For  identifying Artaud with the museum hosting his exhibition, changing Mômo to Moma, is not 
just an irresistible pun but an attempt to disable the Mômo's defences against institutional exclusion 
or appropriation by identifying him with an institution.   But the title was equally a  test of the 
museum's defences which was indeed  'not judged presentable or decent by the Moma, quite 
properly' (Derrida 2002, 11). Resisting identification with Artaud, the museum admitted Derrida's 
talk but without a title - Jacques Derrida...will present a lecture about Artaud's drawings' ( Derrida 
2002, 11-12) – unwittingly repeating the gesture of Artaud's 'Cry'.   
!
Once inside Moma, Derrida voices the Mômo by opening and closing his talk with the 'voice of 
Artaud' – samples from the recording of Artaud's broadcast Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu.  
Derrida thus wraps his voice in the voice of Artaud playing the Mômo, giving him the first and last 
word.  But is he really giving the Mômo the honour of the alpha and omega, is he really risking 
contagion by such proximity?  His sampling from a broadcast that was never broadcast may seem a 
homage, granting Artaud in New York the voice denied him in France – but only partially and on 
terms governed by the shape – the beginning and end - of Derrida's talk.  Derrida's talk substitutes 
itself for the body of Artaud's broadcast,  most of which is, once again, silenced.  By this framing, 
Derrida runs little risk of ingestion by the Mômo; indeed the 'homage' of reproducing Artaud 
innoculates against contagion through the homeopathic citation of a particularly histrionic broadcast 
in which Artaud voices the Mômo as completely mad.  For this was not the 'voice of Artaud,' but of 
Artaud immunising himself against resistance by speaking in the voice of the Mômo.   
!
The question of whether Artaud became the Moma on its or on the Mômo's terms repeats the 
encounter with Rivière: does he enter literature on its terms or must these terms change in order to 
admit him. Derrida approaches this question by means of a diversion, not towards the clinical/
critical distinction mobilised by Rivière but another: 'Our question, one of our questions, thus will 
be, I repeat: what is a coup?' (Derrida 2002, 18)  This question provokes a sequence of sub-
questions beginning with  'What would this have to do today with a museum, and for example an 
exhibition in a museum such as the Moma?' (Derrida 2002, 18)  Derrida begins to respond to these 
questions thetically : 'To deliver oneself to the force of this coup it is necessary to expose, I want to 
say expose cruelly, this exhibition.' (Derrida 2002, 18).  This is a crucial and complex moment in 
the controlled undoing of Artaud-immunity, one in which the exhibition is 'exposed' that is to say, 
its immune defences dismantled.  Derrida explores the options: at first he seems to move in the 
direction of Rivière's strategy by maintaining that the museum is indeed capable of giving 
hospitality (on its terms) to a singularity such as Artaud, but quickly moves to disabuse his audience 
of this fantasy. Feigning gratitude for the reaffirmed and thus betrayed singularity of  'the chance 
offered by the museum, the chance of a hospitality for which one must give thanks, because a 
museum only shows original works and bans in principle reproduction' (Derrida 2002, 18)  Derrida 
avoids the recourse to Rivière's strategy but with reference to the museum rather than literature.  
The madman may be admitted to the museum on its terms, but might the Mômo not devour the 
Moma?  And is not the chance in question one that the event of Artaud might strike the museum, 
disable its defences and turn Moma into Mômo?   
!
Derrida's ambivalence is almost painful at this point, and is expressed in a sequence of Artaud-
immune assertions:  'In my case'  I  'do not always like or approve the philosophical or political 
content...' 'I resist in particular everything in this work that...' I passionately admire Artaud while  'I 
am also tied to a kind of reasoned detestation, a resistant antipathy...' I am in  'a kind of incessant 
war that, like antipathy itself, makes Artaud a privileged enemy...' (Derrida 2002, 19) It is an 
antipathy that 'resists but remains an alliance, it commands a vigilance of thought, and I dare to 
hope that Artaud, the spectre of Artaud, would not have disavowed it.' (Derrida 2002, 20).  Aware of 
the resistance of the MOMA to the  Mômo – not even the title of his talk is acceptable -  Derrida 
seeks to protect the Mômo, standing in for the defences against repressive institutions that he thinks 
Artaud has already disabled in a suicidal autoimmune gesture.  Yet he is also aware that to guard 
Artaud's body against the blows that it invites – to be his immune defence – simplifies and 
undermines the very defences of Artaud's immunity.  
!
Towards the end of his performance Derrida returns to his vigilant alliance with the spectre of 
Artaud against the institutions including himself. He asks himself, or rather the spectre asks him, 
what is he doing in Moma?  All his previous visits to the museum seem but preparations for the 
arrival of Artaud – it had not existed until he came and occupied it.  This is not a matter of 'the 
visitation or visible apparition of Antonin Artaud in a temple of the visual arts, nor the assumption 
of the revenant Artaud in the sky of the New World or the great sperm bank of painting, not the 
rapture or abduction of Saint Artaud in this religious site of modern art' (Derrida 2002, 99). None of 
this, 'but the return of Artaud-Momo' for whose spectre Derrida imagines himself to be the 
bodyguard or 'garde de corps' but only for 'an instant'.  Although he was perilously close to joining 
Paula Thévenin in her attempt to constitute an immune defence for the legacy of Artaud, he draws 
or rather is pushed back.  And while Derrida can hear Artaud's modulation of coup and corps – and 
so divine the strategy of Artaud-immunity that identifies the body with the blows it suffers, the right 
to speak lodged in the court of Jacques Rivière – in the face of this non-suicidal affirmation Derrida 
as so often before prefers to cite a 'No'  before moving to disable Artaud's immunity: 'Poor Artaud. 
What happened to him. Nothing would be spared him, the Mômo. Nothing. Not even the survival of 
his  spectre, not even the most equivocal and cruelly ambiguous, the most vain and anachronistic of 
revenges' (Derrida 2002, 104).  The Mômo is buried alive in the Moma, or rather the spectre of the 
Mômo is immolated in the museum.  Derrida laments and pities his disgrace, but not without a trace 
of bad conscience. 
!
Yet as so often in Derrida's readings of Artaud,  another, affirmative non-suicidal reading is also 
possible. Nothing was spared Artaud, because Artaud's autoimmunity was sufficiently disabled not 
just to absorb all the blows in a paroxysm of suffering but to become the blows in all senses of the 
term. It becomes the Mômo or celestial poet to be open to all blows.  In another reading of Artaud-
immunity, the blows can be invited for reasons other than the pathos of suicide or self-destruction; 
the disabling of immune defences on Artaud's part is undertaken from a position of strength and life, 
not from weakness and death.  The blows aimed by the institutions encounter not a suffering body 
but an ideal chaos which absorbs and returns their energy. In his Artaud wars, Derrida sometimes 
appreciated this in his mad enemy, but his recognition of the complexity of Artaud-immunity is 
quickly reduced to replaying a suicidal gesture.  Artaud's Nietzschean freedom from the spirit of 
revenge – the ability to absorb blows without ressentiment, without responding to them on the 
adversary's terms – is in the end pitied by Derrida as susceptibility to 'the most vain and 
anachronistic revenges'.  Artaud is betrayed and his theatre of cruelty reduced to the terms of 
bourgeois theatre, of transgression and retribution.  
!
 Artaud-immunity is a far more complex and sophisticated manoeuvre than the self-destructive or 
suicidal disabling of immune defences.  Artaud himself was fully aware of this, assuming the role of 
the Mômo or man without defences not as a subtle form of defence but as the assumption of a 
position beyond offence and defence.  The Mômo was indifferent to suicide, the disabling of his 
own defences or auto-immunity was to enhance chaotic life and never for death.  He was not to be 
reasoned with nor fought against. Indeed, at the end of Derrida's self-declared thirty years war the 
Mômo emerges as neither his friend nor his enemy, neither his vanquished nor vanquisher, but 
simply elsewhere.      
!
!
  
!
My thanks to the members of the seminar 'Artaud and Philosophy' in the Department of Philosophy, 
University of Paris VIII for their help with reading 'Cry'.  
!!
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